



**PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK**

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INFORMAL MEETING OF THE PLENARY ON THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE COUNCIL (IGN)

STATEMENT BY H.E. CHRISTIAN WENAWESER

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LIECHTENSTEIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Thank you so much to the Co-Chairs and everybody in the room today. By way of opening, I briefly want to reflect on how far we have come over the past year. The success of the model-based discussion, as well as the text agreed in the Pact for the Future, have demonstrated not only the leadership of our Co-Chairs but also the hard work of delegations to find common ground. We agree with the Secretary-General when he said that the Pact contains the “The strongest language on Council reform in a generation”. Our aim today is to build on that momentum.

I’m grateful for this opportunity to present our model for a reformed Security Council in a revised form. In doing so, we have drawn on a number of sources. We listened closely to the comments and recommendations which you made to us earlier this year. Some of those comments reflected technical issues, which have been adjusted accordingly. Others of those reflected an evolution in our collective thinking, particularly in the area of representation, since we first presented our model. I look forward shortly to discussing how these comments have been reflected. Of course, a significant proportion of comments reflected the long-standing and principled positions of Member States and groups that map out the major areas of compromise that we will have to traverse to achieve Council reform. We are more confident now than we were in January that

these compromises are achievable. And we believe that the central aspect of our model, notably the long-term renewable seats that we propose, remains close to the 'landing zone' for this process.

One reason for our sense of hope is that we have spent much of this year engaging in a genuine negotiation on behalf of our leaders in the Pact for the Future. We can now see, in a publicly endorsed manner, what we can all agree on in terms of Council reform. Liechtenstein has reflected elements of the relevant actions in our model where appropriate.

Colleagues,

You will all have seen the document that we shared a few weeks ago outlining the edits to our model, and so I will not read them out verbatim here. But I hope you will permit me to say a few words regarding our rationale for each of the edits in turn.

In paragraph 2, we make a technical edit to ensure that the names of all regional groups are consistent with their official titles in the UN system.

We add a new provision in ***paragraph 3 bis***; this codifies the already existing practice that a member of the League of Arab States serves on the Security Council. In ***3 ter***, we outline a similar provision for the group of Small Island Developing States, using a UN definition – a step that we have heard increasingly strong support for amongst the membership. In so doing, we do not explicitly add extra seats, but acknowledge the need for better representation of these groups in the work of the Security Council. These changes also reflect the agreement in the Pact for the Future in Action 39(c), as well as, in particular, the response to the question of cross-regional groups which we raised in the initial presentation of our model earlier this year.

Paragraph 8 also includes a technical edit to bring the document up to date.

Paragraph 9 expands the scope of the review clause, agreed in Action 39(f) of the Pact for the Future. We are, on the whole, pleased that the idea of review clause has been accepted so widely amongst the membership. We appreciate that various groups, including the G4 and L.69, have included versions of a review clause in their models. Our modified text accordingly attempts to take a more inclusive approach. While we continue to believe that the categories of seats and question of the veto remain the central issues around which Security Council reform revolves, we appreciate that others may also wish to raise additional issues relevant to Council reform in the context of the review. This edit allows for such issues to be raised.

Finally, we begin to elucidate a **Part II** on Working Methods of an enlarged Security Council. We have begun by addressing what we believe are some of the most important aspects of the working methods in an expanded Council. We have set a fraction – $3/5$ – for an affirmative vote of the Council. Such an approach allows for further reform of the Council in the future without having to renegotiate the number required for an affirmative vote each time. It also marginally reduces the proportion of the Council needed to block a resolution. In the absence of veto reform of the permanent members, we believe that an effective Council should seek broad agreement.

In a Council of this size, it is possible that a Member State elected to a 2-year term will not become President of the Council according to alphabetical order. We want to make sure all Members are able to serve as President during their term. Holding the Presidency is an essential opportunity for Members of the Council to contribute to its agenda, and one that no Member should miss for reasons of English alphabetical order. In line with the text of Action 41(c) of the Pact, we should consider the distribution of Chairs and Vice-Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Council, and how these can be equitably distributed given the Council's expanded Membership. Similarly, and in line with Action 39(f), a larger Council Membership may lead to a longer meeting time; measures should be considered to reduce these, for example, the use of group Statements as is considered in the General Assembly and on occasion in the Council, for example in the Annual Working

Methods Open Debate. The arrangements themselves are left open to the Council to agree and deliver.

Finally, we have, of course, reflected the collective commitment in Action 39(g) of the Pact to intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use. We know that this is a central issue to be addressed in the future direction of the Council, in which the veto, and the threat of its use, severely prevents it from delivering on the mandate it has been given under the Charter. And in a larger and hopefully more representative Council, the idea that one State would be able to prevent it from acting is even more concerning. As we said in introducing our model earlier this year, an agreement on enlargement has to be accompanied by a commitment concerning the use of the veto as currently provided for under the Charter. We look forward to hearing from all Members regarding their proposals for elements that could be included under this heading.

Colleagues,

That concludes a brief overview of the edits made to our model. We are very pleased to have had the opportunity to revise and resubmit our model, and hope that others who have already submitted a model will also shortly be in a position to do likewise. And we would of course greatly benefit from others who, having not done so yet, choose to bring their concrete proposals to the membership for discussion. We look forward to engaging on your proposals and look forward to your engagement on Liechtenstein's model today.

I thank you.