



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK**

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM (IGN)

**CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP, REGIONAL REPRESENTATION**

**STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR CHRISTIAN WENAWESER**

**PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

Madam Chair,

As is reflected in our framework document, Liechtenstein favors the creation of a **new category of membership**. Six seats with terms of longer duration, for example eight or ten years, with incumbents eligible for immediate re-election. Looking at the framework document, we note that our ideas are very similar to those of Ireland, and that others – including, for example, Montenegro, Indonesia and Turkey in the course of the debate today – have stated their openness to compromise solutions. Indeed, our model is intended as a compromise between those who aspire to permanent membership on the one hand, and those who do not. This model would enable States to serve in practice permanently on the Security Council, if they so wish and of course if the membership decides to elect them consecutively. The creation of new veto rights – viewed with suspicion by many, including ourselves – would be avoided.

The model provides flexibility for the dimension of size which we believe can be very useful. If there is a desire in the membership to decide on a relatively small enlargement in a first phase, our model can easily lead to a Council of 21 or 22 members – with the creation of six long-term seats and an possibly an additional traditional two year seat given to the Eastern European

Group – in which case the option of further enlargement would become a central element of the review process. The review clause has an essential place in our model either way, as it is both mandatory and comprehensive: It is thus clearly decided that after a determined period of time – say 16 or 20 years – the General Assembly will revisit the question and that all aspects of reform will be on the table, in light of the experience made with the enlarged Council.

Finally, our enlargement model also addressed an issue that came up in the discussions this morning, namely the risk of (further) undermining the chances of small States to serve on the Security Council. As one of the smallest member States of the United Nations which has never served on the Council we are obviously particularly sensitive to this issue. We have therefore addressed it through what we call the “flip flop clause”: This provision ensures that States who run for a longer term seat and do so unsuccessfully are barred from running for a two year seat for the entire time period they had presented their candidature for. This would not only safeguard the interests of small States, but in fact slightly improve their chances to serve.

On the issue of **regional representation**, we must distinguish between two things: There is first of all geographical representation which indeed is one of the key issues that SC enlargement must address – as the part of the world that we are from is clearly overrepresented which leads to an unhealthy political imbalance. And much has been said in this debate – and earlier ones – on the underrepresentation of developing countries. As far as substantive representation of the views of a region, which some of my colleagues seem to have been talking about, we simply wish to note that this is something that is not reflected in current practice, including by States from organizations that have a common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, we would like to know how the view that certain groupings that are not regional groups would be given a seat in a reformed SC. It is our understanding that this could only be achieved through informal agreements, but are interested to hear different views and approaches.

We have also been invited to talk about a **proposed review mechanism**. Let me just say that we have already indicated that our model gives a key role to such a review mechanism. Furthermore, past experience makes it very clear that a review can only be meaningful if it is mandatory, takes place at a predetermined time and with clarity on its scope. All these conditions are met in our enlargement proposal as well.

I thank you.